Please scroll down to see a complete list of my publications and earlier versions of some published papers.
Publications:
“Endogenous Criteria for Success”, Journal of Economic Theory, Volume 214, December 2023, article 105760. [paper] [preprint].
“Contest Design with Stochastic Performance”, American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, 15: 201—238, February 2023. [paper] [preprint]
“Efficiency in Asymmetric Auctions with Endogenous Reserve Prices”, Games and Economic Behavior, 132: 234-239, March 2022. [paper] [preprint]
“Ranking Reversals in Asymmetric Auctions”, Journal of Mathematical Economics, Volume 95, article 102478, August 2021. [paper] [preprint]
“Contracting with Private Rewards”, The RAND Journal of Economics, 51 (2): 589-612, Summer 2020. [paper] [preprint] [online appendix]
“Scale Effects in Multi-Unit Auctions” (with Rebecca Elskamp), Games and Economic Behavior, 116: 116-121, July 2019. [paper] [preprint with online appendix]
“Moral Hazard and the Spanning Condition without the First-Order Approach”, Games and Economic Behavior, 102: 373-387, March 2017. [paper]
“A Unifying Approach to Incentive Compatibility in Moral Hazard Problems”, Theoretical Economics, 12: 25-51, January 2017. [paper] [appendix]
“Ranking Asymmetric Auctions: Filling the Gap between a Distributional Shift and Stretch”, Games and Economic Behavior, 85: 60-69, May 2014. [paper]
“Handicaps in Incomplete Information All-Pay Auctions with a Diverse Set of Bidders”, European Economic Review, 64:98-110, November 2013. [paper]
“Using Economic Theory to Guide Numerical Analysis: Solving for Equilibria in Models of Asymmetric First-Price Auctions” (with Timothy P. Hubbard and Harry J. Paarsch), Computational Economics, 42 (2): 241-266, August 2013. [paper]
“Incomplete Information and Rent Dissipation in Deterministic Contests”, International Journal of Industrial Organization (Special Issue on Tournaments), 31 (3): 261-266, May 2013. [paper]
“A Mechanism Design Approach to Ranking Asymmetric Auctions”, Econometrica, 80 (5): 2349–2364, September 2012. [paper] [online appendix]
“Favoritism in Asymmetric Contests: Head Starts and Handicaps”, Games and Economic Behavior, 76 (1): 226–248, September 2012. [paper] [WP version]
“Asymmetric First Price Auctions”, Journal of Economic Theory, 144 (4): 1617-1635, July 2009. [paper] [earlier version]
“Buy-out Prices in Auctions: Seller Competition and Multi-Unit Demands” (with Per B. Overgaard), The RAND Journal of Economics, 39 (3): 770–789, Autumn 2008. [paper] [appendix]
“Comparative Statics and Welfare in Heterogeneous All-Pay Auctions: Bribes, Caps, and Performance Thresholds”, The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, 8 (1): Article 21 (Topics), September 2008. [paper]
“Pre-Auction Offers in Asymmetric First-Price and Second-Price Auctions” (with Per B. Overgaard), Games and Economic Behavior, 63 (1): 145-165, 2008. [paper]
“A Short Proof of the Bulow-Klemperer Auctions vs. Negotiations Result”, Economic Theory, 28 (2), 449-452, 2006. [paper]
“Participation Fees vs. Reserve Prices in Auctions with Asymmetric or Colluding Buyers”, Economics Letters, 89(3), 328-332, 2005. [paper]
Earlier versions of published papers:
“Efficiency in Asymmetric Auctions with Endogenous Reserve Prices” (published in Games and Economic Behavior). An earlier version with a more detailed analysis of auctions with several strong bidders is [here].
“Contest Design with Stochastic Performance” (accepted for publication in the American Economic Journal: Microeconomics). A previous version with more extensions is [here]. An early version of the paper circulated under the title “Microfounded Contest Design.”
“Ranking Reversals in Asymmetric Auctions” (published in the Journal of Mathematical Economics). A previous version, “Ranking Asymmetric Auctions with Several Bidders”, with more examples can be found [here].
“Contracting with Private Rewards” (published in The RAND Journal of Economics). An early version with more focus on the multiplicative model is [here]. A version with a different numerical example is [here].
“Local Incentive Compatibility in Moral Hazard Problems: A Unifying Approach”, May 2013. [paper] This is a preliminary paper which was split into two: “A Unifying Approach to Incentive Compatibility in Moral Hazard Problems” (published in TE) and “Moral Hazard and the Spanning Condition without the First-Order Approach” (published in GEB).
“Ranking Asymmetric Auctions using the Dispersive Order”, February 2011. [paper] Parts of this paper have been published in Econometrica as “A Mechanism Design Approach to Ranking Asymmetric Auctions”. Other parts of this paper have been published in Games and Economic Behavior as “Ranking Asymmetric Auctions: Filling the Gap between a Distributional Shift and Stretch”.
“Favoritism in Asymmetric Contests: Head Starts and Handicaps” (published in Games and Economic Behavior). An earlier version with a more detailed analysis of bidders’ payoffs is here: [WP version]
“Asymmetric First Price Auctions” (published in Journal of Economic Theory). An earlier version with more examples, discussion, etc. is available. [earlier version]
“Buy-out Prices in Auctions: Seller Competition and Multi-Unit Demands” (with Per B. Overgaard, published in The RAND Journal of Economics). An earlier version circulated under the title: “Buy-Out Prices in Online Auctions: Multi-Unit Demand”. [paper]