I’m a Professor and the Canada Research Chair (Tier II) in Risk Management and Regulation in the Department of Economics and Finance, at the University of Guelph.
My research focuses on the role of asymmetric information in situations where economic agents interact strategically. I am particularly interested in auction theory, contest theory, and contract theory.
Please browse my website for further information about my research. A selection of my publications are listed below.
“A Unifying Approach to Incentive Compatibility in Moral Hazard Problems”, Theoretical Economics, 12: 25-51, January 2017. [paper]
“Ranking Asymmetric Auctions: Filling the Gap between a Distributional Shift and Stretch”, Games and Economic Behavior, 85: 60-69, May 2014. [paper]
"A Mechanism Design Approach to Ranking Asymmetric Auctions”, Econometrica, 80 (5): 2349–2364, September 2012. [paper] [online appendix]
“Favoritism in Asymmetric Contests: Head Starts and Handicaps”, Games and Economic Behavior, 76 (1): 226–248, September 2012. [paper] [WP version]
“Asymmetric First Price Auctions”, Journal of Economic Theory, 144 (4): 1617-1635, July 2009. [paper] [earlier version]
“Buy-out Prices in Auctions: Seller Competition and Multi-Unit Demands” (with Per B. Overgaard), The RAND Journal of Economics, 39 (3): 770–789, Autumn 2008. [paper] [appendix]