I am a professor in the Department of Economics and Finance at the University of Guelph. I grew up in Denmark and received most of my post-secondary education at the University of Aarhus. I also spent some time in England and received a M.Sc. from the University of York.
My research focuses on asymmetric information in settings where economic agents interact strategically. My earliest work was in auction theory and I remain particularly interested in auction theory and contract theory. I also have an interest in contest theory, in large part because contests share many similarities with auction and contracting problems. My work on auctions has been published in such journals as Econometrica, JET, RAND, and GEB. My work on contracts has been published in TE, JET, RAND, and GEB. Finally, my work on contests has been published in journals such as AER: Micro, GEB, and EER.
A selection of my publications are listed below.
Selected publications:
“Endogenous Criteria for Success”, Journal of Economic Theory, Volume 214, December 2023, article 105760. [paper] [preprint].
“Contest Design with Stochastic Performance”, American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, 15: 201—238, February 2023. [paper] [preprint]
“Contracting with Private Rewards”, The RAND Journal of Economics, 51 (2): 589-612, Summer 2020. [paper] [preprint] [online appendix]
“A Unifying Approach to Incentive Compatibility in Moral Hazard Problems”, Theoretical Economics, 12: 25-51, January 2017. [paper]
“A Mechanism Design Approach to Ranking Asymmetric Auctions”, Econometrica, 80 (5): 2349–2364, September 2012. [paper] [online appendix]
“Favoritism in Asymmetric Contests: Head Starts and Handicaps”, Games and Economic Behavior, 76 (1): 226–248, September 2012. [paper] [WP version]
“Asymmetric First Price Auctions”, Journal of Economic Theory, 144 (4): 1617-1635, July 2009. [paper] [earlier version]
“Buy-out Prices in Auctions: Seller Competition and Multi-Unit Demands” (with Per B. Overgaard), The RAND Journal of Economics, 39 (3): 770–789, Autumn 2008. [paper] [appendix]