Please scroll down to see a complete list of my publications, working papers (by topic), and earlier versions of some published papers.
“Moral Hazard and the Spanning Condition without the First-Order Approach”, Games and Economic Behavior, 102: 373-387, March 2017. [paper]
“Ranking Asymmetric Auctions: Filling the Gap between a Distributional Shift and Stretch”, Games and Economic Behavior, 85: 60-69, May 2014. [paper]
“Handicaps in Incomplete Information All-Pay Auctions with a Diverse Set of Bidders”, European Economic Review, 64:98-110, November 2013. [paper]
“Using Economic Theory to Guide Numerical Analysis: Solving for Equilibria in Models of Asymmetric First-Price Auctions” (with Timothy P. Hubbard and Harry J. Paarsch), Computational Economics, 42 (2): 241-266, August 2013. [paper]
“Incomplete Information and Rent Dissipation in Deterministic Contests”, International Journal of Industrial Organization (Special Issue on Tournaments), 31 (3): 261-266, May 2013. [paper]
“Comparative Statics and Welfare in Heterogeneous All-Pay Auctions: Bribes, Caps, and Performance Thresholds”, The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, 8 (1): Article 21 (Topics), September 2008. [paper]
“A Short Proof of the Bulow-Klemperer Auctions vs. Negotiations Result”, Economic Theory, 28 (2), 449-452, 2006. [paper]
“Participation Fees vs. Reserve Prices in Auctions with Asymmetric or Colluding Buyers”, Economics Letters, 89(3), 328-332, 2005. [paper]
A. Moral Hazard/Contract Theory:
“Fisher Information and Incentives in Contracting,” December 2017 [paper].
“Common Agency with Disjoint Information”, April 2015 [currently dormant; contact me for an early draft].
B. Auction Theory:
“A Poor Bidder’s Perspective on All-Pay Auctions: More Competitors, Please”, June 2011. [paper]
“The Phantom Made Me Jump! Preemptive Jump Bidding in (Takeover) Auctions”, November 2006. [paper]
Earlier versions of published papers:
“Local Incentive Compatibility in Moral Hazard Problems: A Unifying Approach”, May 2013. [paper] This is a preliminary paper which was split into two: “A Unifying Approach to Incentive Compatibility in Moral Hazard Problems” (published in TE) and “Moral Hazard and the Spanning Condition without the First-Order Approach” (published in GEB).
“Ranking Asymmetric Auctions using the Dispersive Order”, February 2011. [paper] Parts of this paper have been published in Econometrica as “A Mechanism Design Approach to Ranking Asymmetric Auctions”. Other parts of this paper have been published in Games and Economic Behavior as “Ranking Asymmetric Auctions: Filling the Gap between a Distributional Shift and Stretch”.
“Favoritism in Asymmetric Contests: Head Starts and Handicaps” (published in Games and Economic Behavior). An earlier version with a more detailed analysis of bidders’ payoffs is here: [WP version]
“Asymmetric First Price Auctions”, (published in Journal of Economic Theory). An earlier version with more examples, discussion, etc. is available. [earlier version]
“Buy-out Prices in Auctions: Seller Competition and Multi-Unit Demands” (with Per B. Overgaard, published in The RAND Journal of Economics). An earlier version circulated under the title: “Buy-Out Prices in Online Auctions: Multi-Unit Demand”. [paper]